19–23 Jun 2023
Hofburg Palace & Online
Europe/Vienna timezone

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Protocol: Possible Hindrance for On-Site Inspection Obligations

20 Jun 2023, 10:00


Board: 31
E-poster T4.5 On-Site Inspection Team Functionality Lightning talks: P1.2-1, P3.1, P3.4, P4.5


Mr Nalin de Silva (Geological Survey and Mines Bureau)


Compared to many other Treaties and international conventions, one of the unique and in-built characters of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is its Protocol. Considering the sensitivity that is required to address the verification regime, having limitations and even restrictions on matters pertaining to national security is understandable. Yet, listing the tools as a part of the Protocol is having a negative impact particularly on on-site inspection (OSI) functions, as accommodation of novel technologies is discouraged. The “National Technical Means (NTM)” might bridge the gap between the advanced technologies and listed stalled tools of the Protocol. The NTM could serves well in the planning stage of the OSI as the waveform analysis of the verification regime (International Monitoring System) could be integrated with NTM inputs. However, once the inspection is initiated the inspected State Party (ISP) could limit the NTM information flow and most importantly the inspection team has to rely on the outdated tools provided in the Protocol for the OSI inspection. Maintaining the balance between the successes of OSI objectives while securing national interests, the States Parties shall identify an agreeable solution towards upgrading OSI tools in par with the technological advancement.

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The advancement of OSI tools and technologies are hindered by the Protocol, and may not developed in par with concealment tactics/strategies of potential violations.

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Primary author

Mr Nalin de Silva (Geological Survey and Mines Bureau)

Presentation materials