Description
E-poster session with display of each e-poster on an assigned touchscreen
The inspected State Party (ISP) is a key role for on-site inspection (OSI) integrated exercises as it represents the sovereign rights of the inspected State, and thus keeps the integrated exercise play realistic, while providing a view of what may be experienced by an inspected State and what they may be required to provide in the case of hosting an actual on-site inspection. We will discuss...
On-site inspection (OSI) is a verification mechanism that would strengthen the confidence among States in the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, especially the confidence between IT and ISP during the real OSI. To achieve this goal, a culture of anti-counterfeiting for OSI would be essential for building confidence in OSI activities. Quantum Stealth Code is based on a kind of special ink...
An Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) is the most advanced training procedure that simulates an on-site inspection (OSI) and is designed to train inspectors, providing hands-on experience of a potential OSI. Once the Treaty enters into force (EIF), conduct of an OSI on a request of an ambiguous event may become a reality and the OSI inspectorate shall have adequate training to deliver the...
On-site inspections (OSI) serve as the ultimate verification measure under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Geospatial Information Management for OSI (GIMO) system is critical in these inspections, facilitating mission planning and decision making through advanced geospatial and analytical tools. While GIMO represents a technological leap in inspection methodology, its...
Gravitational field mapping (GRV) is one of the techniques that an inspection team can use during a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) on-site inspection (OSI). High precision microgravity surveys may be able to detect the gravitational anomalies created by subsurface observables related to an underground nuclear explosion, namely the presence of a cavity around the...
On-site inspection (OSI) of nuclear test events is different from other arms control verification activities, due to the risks of possible nuclear radiation hazards. Consequently, OSI training and exercises can be practical and meaningful only if they can be conducted under a nuclear radiation environment. However, this would raise great health and safety challenges for inspection team...
On-site inspections (OSIs) under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) require inspectors to operate in complex environments where radiological concerns may arise. While their primary objective is technical verification, inspectors may need to address stakeholder uncertainties regarding radiation risks. Drawing on lessons learned from the aftermath of the Chernobyl and Fukushima...
On-Site Inspections (OSIs) are critical to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization’s (CTBTO) mission of verifying compliance with the Treaty. The complexity of an OSI necessitates continuous and effective training for surrogate inspectors of the non-standing inspectorate. The computer-based and online training programme is designed to prepare surrogate inspectors for in-person...
A method for assessing the reduction in effectiveness of on-site inspections, taking into account the frequency and duration of potential illnesses among inspection team members, as well as recommendations for reducing the likelihood of these illnesses, has been developed. The models used account for the geographical and climatic characteristics of the regions, as well as the season during...
The effective implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) requires meticulous planning and execution of on-site inspections (OSI), essential for verifying compliance with the CTBT. A crucial component of an OSI is inspection via overflight, which provides comprehensive data much needed to narrow down the search area and support ground operations. Innovative training...
In the practical scenarios, On-Site Inspection (OSI) could be conducted in any place that is in an environment with radiation hazards. Traditional radiation shielding materials are mainly made of lead-containing rubber materials. Although lead is a good radiation shielding material, its high toxicity, overweight and unstable shielding efficiency also cause irreversible damage to the human body...
For verification purposes, it is crucial to obtain comprehensive information time-efficiently. Alongside gamma measurement results, neutron data plays a key role in the evaluation. A promising approach is the simultaneous detection of gamma and neutron radiation using a combined detector, such as the NaIL detector. It is based on sodium iodide (NaI). The NaI is doped with 6Li,...
Once the Treaty enters into force (EIF), the on-site inspection (OSI) team could be in a position to conduct an OSI almost in any environment. The main training process of the OSI Inspectorate, Integrated Field Exercise (IFE), could not practically be performed in demanding and different environments with all possible scenarios. Hence, building up plausible alternatives could be an added asset...
In preparation for the Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) and based on lessons learned from the past field exercises, the Equipment and Implementation section of the On-site Inspection (OSI) Division of the Provisional Technical Secretariat has redesigned the technology infrastructure of the OSI field laboratory for full compatibility of computing platforms, internal data transmission and data...
During on-site inspection (OSI) training or small exercises focused on specific techniques, decontamination control procedures were typically the subject of discussion between IT leadership due to the fictitious scenario, human resources, equipment deployed and limited time. The goal of this presentation is to show and discuss a new approach to establishing a decontamination line,...
In preparation for the next on-site inspection (OSI) integrated field exercise (IFE), the OSI Operations Support Centre (OSC) at the Provisional Technical Secretariat underwent several process changes aimed at improving the OSC capability to support the inspection team and to support the PTS' senior management in its OSI-related activities. The changes include increased efficiency, new...
On-Site Inspection (OSI) Build-Up Exercise 2024 (BUE24) was a medium scale exercise focusing on the continuation period of an OSI, conducted in Hungary and involving over 150 participants from 37 States Signatories over three weeks in June-July 2024. Considerable work has been undertaken by the OSI Division and wider Provisional Technical Secretariat to develop OSI capabilities since the last...
The On-Site Inspection (OSI) Communications System is an advanced framework enabling seamless and secure communication during inspections under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Designed for rapid deployment, potentially anywhere in the world within six days, it supports real time coordination among inspection team members and between field teams and the Operations Support...
The On-Site Inspection (OSI) Directed Exercises in 2023 were the first field exercises conducted under the framework of the OSI exercise programme for 2022-2025 and the first field exercises conducted since the Integrated Field Exercise in 2014 (IFE14). The Directed Exercises aimed to demonstrate and evaluate progress made in the development of selected OSI technical and operational...
A robust health, safety, and security management system is foundational to ensuring that on-site inspection (OSI) activities under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty are conducted safely, efficiently, and effectively while maintaining the trust and cooperation of all parties involved. A build-up exercise and prior training highlighted three vectors which are integral to instilling a...
The On-Site Inspection (OSI) Exercise Programme for 2022-2025 is envisaged to culminate with the conduct of an Integrated Field Exercise (IFE): the largest and most complex multinational exercises in the field of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. The primary aim is to test and demonstrate the capability of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban...
In preparation for the Integrated Field Exercise (IFE) and in line with the capabilities developed with past field exercises and expert meetings, the On-site Inspection (OSI) Division of the Provisional Technical Secretariat has entered into a new stage of development. Among radionuclides techniques in use at OSI, systems which are operational for gamma radiation monitoring and low resolution...
On-site inspection (OSI) is part of the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), along with the International Monitoring System and the International Data Center. OSI is in a developmental phase that includes large Integrated Field Exercises (IFE). Build-up exercises (BUE) are meant to prepare the equipment, procedures, inspectors, and training. The most recent...
A nuclear weapon explosion emitted radioactive contamination into the environment. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBTO) in paragraph 69 of the protocol on “Inspection Activities and Techniques” refers to the tests that must be collected as evidence to prove the origin of the explosion. These samples are collected in a radiologically contaminated area with a risk to inspectors’...
Base of operations (BOO), as the accommodation and working base of an inspection team, would be a very important facility for an OSI mission. As the OSI would be based on the heavy culture of nuclear, the radiation safety of BOO has its special significance. In the practical case, continued monitoring of the radiation level and the identification of the radioactive sources at BOO, would have...
Large scale on-site inspection (OSI) exercises – especially with limited resources directly available on site – require robust support infrastructure well beyond the standard support requirements of an inspection team. Additional exercise participants and teams (such as personnel playing notional “inspected State Party” roles, exercise control team, external evaluation team, management team,...
The Build-Up Exercise 2024 (BUE24) in Hungary was the first large scale on-site inspection (OSI) exercise to involve a working tunnel complex, opening up new possibilities for the Scenario Task Force designing the exercise scenario. A scenario was developed that involved both radioparticulate detections at the tunnel entrance and radioxenon detections from shallow sub-surface samples taken in...
After the triggering event and political decision to dispatch the inspection team to the inspection area, on-site inspection (OSI) would be initiated at a geological location. Before the inspection team arrives at the point of entry, OSI can only be primarily planned on a GIS platform with the support of International Data Centre data input. The inspection area with the boundaries would be...
