Speaker
Description
A qualitative analysis of regime members’ positions regarding the role, characteristics and importance of challenge-type inspections in multilateral arms control regimes is undertaken through a comparative case study of challenge (CIs) and on-site (OSIs) inspection mechanisms provided for under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), respectively. The policies of regime members with respect to challenge-type inspections is examined in light of Regime Theory as well as a research model proposed by Rittberger, Zangl and Kruck to study the political system of international organizations. The main findings clearly highlight that regime members consider challenge-type inspections as integral elements of the CWC and CTBT verification regimes and, although likely to be employed only in exceptional circumstances, represent an adequate and valuable verification mechanism. Moreover, though challenge-type inspections are in essence technical fact finding missions, the overall verification process is inherently political in nature and ultimately depends on the political will and trust exhibited by regime members.
