

A realistic Inspected State Party as a required OSI integrated exercise participant for the application of the Inspection Team Functionality

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CTBTO
PREPARATORY COMMISSION

PUTTING AN
END TO NUCLEAR
EXPLOSIONS

INTRODUCTION AND MAIN RESULTS

The inspected State Party (ISP) is a key role for on-site inspection (OSI) integrated exercises as it represents the sovereign rights of the inspected State, and thus keeps the integrated exercise play realistic, while providing a view of what may be experienced by an inspected State and what they may be required to provide in the case of hosting an actual on-site inspection. In particular, we will focus on the impact on the inspection team functionality of the ISP strategy of providing differing plausible explanations of the triggering event for the BUE24 scenario, using the ISP national implementation requirements concerning private property, and how that worked during the exercise.


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
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ITF is a fact-based methodology that delays the decision bias we all have until facts are present



OSIs need to be factually based! You see a drawing. Duck or rabbit is an interpretation that your mind makes subconsciously.



Which line is longer?

For a fact-based methodology to work the OSI must take place in a self-consistent area

The CTBT Protocol specifies the technologies that can be used by the inspectors in paragraph 69. The OSI approved equipment list is based upon those techniques. What the equipment measures or what the inspectors visually observe have to be internally self consistent with the physics of the scenario.



If the observations or facts do not align with one another then ITF can find areas that were unintentionally made more interesting. This takes the inspection activities in an unexpected direction that the Exercise managers and control team may need to deal with using injects or data or ISP negotiation tactics. Direct intervention would change the tone of the exercise and make it a directed one vs one based upon the facts found.

The Inspected State Party is an arm of the scenario

The ISP is a state that has been accused of conducting a nuclear explosion. It represents a country of people and resources whose government has agreed to host the OSI according to the Treaty and exercising its treaty rights to prove to the CTBTO Executive Council and the world that it did not violate the treaty.

The OSI Inspection team is 40 inspectors (maximum) in country except during drilling for a radionuclide sample.

The OSI team is dependent on the ISP to provide what it needs to carryout the inspection and to keep the team and instrumentation safe.

The ISP needs to protect the OSI team and also within its treaty rights and obligations protect its sovereignty and make sure the data collected by the team is correctly collected and analyzed. To do this a sizable capability of personnel and equipment is required for the ISP. They represent a country and should have no resource issues.

The ISP is part of the scenario and directed by the exercise managers and control team.



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ISP provides what was negotiated at the OSC prior to arriving in country, including:

- Safety, medical and security to the IT.
- Logistics, fuel, drivers and transportation of personnel and equipment, water, food, radio frequencies and/or communications equipment.
- Provides meeting rooms and accommodations, agreed upon BoO locations(s).
- Any other equipment which the DG requests the ISP to make available to the IT for use in the inspection area.



The provision of communications or technical equipment by the ISP has not been played in OSI exercises so far.

ISP can provide overflight aircraft. For exercises this has been a given and provided through the host country but for play the ISP.

Main areas of exercise play


Operations Support Centre – Creation of the Treaty Mandate following acceptance of the Request for Inspection. ISP diplomatic liaison is expected to negotiate area of inspection, support to the IT, POE expectations.

Point of Entry/Exit – ISP equipment inspection rights exercised. Presentation of the Mandate to the ISP by the IT. Initial Inspection Plan presentation and negotiations. Logistics and Operations Support Plan and negotiations, Transportation of equipment and personnel to the BoO.

Base of Operations (BoO) – Receiving area for data and receiving area for samples coming from the field. Joint areas for ISP and IT work and preparations of missions. IT Office premises. IT equipment storage, lab premises, power distribution, medical, communications, meeting room(s).

Inspection Area as delineated in the inspection mandate. Accessed through negotiation between IT and ISP on a daily basis usually with D+2 planning to allow ISP (host) to arrange for access and address any security issues.

The IT uses a series of meetings to plan and execute the Inspection



The ISP needs a strategy to match up to each of the IT meetings and be ready for the twice daily ISP/IT Leadership meetings



ISP Strategy to mimic/mirror the IT meetings And be present at all activities

ICM-1: Morning briefing

- This will happen at the BoO. Confirm ISP folks are ready for their assignments.

ICLM-1: Review of logic update

- Review of questions received, status of missions, concerns
- Review, plan and/or development of appropriate responses
- Distribution of tasks
- Answers to questions
- Questions for clarification

ICLM-2: Response to draft inspection plan

- Review of draft inspection plan submitted by the IT
- Approval or suggestion to modify the plan (mission by mission)
- Development of an ISP plan, including:
 - names of escorts; equipment to be taken (including comms); data or samples needed;
 - Questions for clarification

ISP/IT Meeting to pass on D-2 feedback and solidify D-1 plans and bring up any topics that need to be discussed about the future or past activities

ICM-2: Evening debriefing

- What happened in the field, the BoO, the hotel; Any Safety issues; Any other issues
- D-1 plans

* The “C” in all the above acronyms refers to the presence of the Control Team in such meetings

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
Escort Strategy (BUE24)

Two-person teams for each field team. Need to be present at all activities.

Will object to the IT going off the perceived planned activity. No entrance to private property until approved by the host and the CT. The IT will be stopped and the escorts will communicate back to ISP management.

Will watch for safety issues and conducting activities not in the agreed plan. Will stop activities and check with ISP Person in charge at the BoO for direction. Anticipate the IT doing the same through their Ops officer.

ISP organigram



Receiving Area (RA) and Classification

At the RA within the LAB and the USB Sticks, the ISP shall retain their data sets. Supervise the Wiper program, joint storage

We will utilize Field notes and tablets to corroborate the IT data collection.

We will emphasize observing a strict chain of custody of data and samples

The same applies to any data on equipment control units.

WA data- the ISP will emphasize the need to have copies of all IT data being used for the inspection and transparency.

Telemetry system data

Data received by the telemetry needs to be shared with the ISP and data from the electronic media replaces the telemetry data in the RA and WA.



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A robust ISP with ISP Equipment and technical capabilities are needed

The ISP is part of the scenario and controlled by the Exercise Management and Control Team

It needs to be able to support the activities in the field with the vehicles, drivers, escorts for execution off the IT missions.

The ISP needs to have the resources to answer the IT questions just like a real state would.

They need to be more familiar with the IA than the IT.

They need their own computer, communications, lab and other spaces to be effective at imitating an actual state and the scenario should take into account the reporting chains within the ISP.

All reporting issues except for actual emergencies should be through the ISP.

Actual emergencies should go through the host, and Exercise management operations centre.



Discussion on communications at the end of the day ICM2 meeting. Note the equipment along the walls. Not shown is the GIS and communications equipment. The CT had a lab for injects.



The aqua marine shirts (IT), and green shirts (eval). Everyone else from the red shirts (ISP), dark blue shirts (CT) and black shirts (EM) made the BUE24 exercise happen. They provided the background which allowed the IT to utilize ITF and successfully execute an OSI while being evaluated for lessons learnt.