

Harnessing Satellite Imagery Analysis for CTBT Verification

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Open Nuclear Network, a PAX *sapiens* programme



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NETWORK**

Nuclear Risks Matter

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About Open Nuclear Network

MISSION: Reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use.

MONITOR: Tracking developments contributing to the escalation of nuclear risks.

ANALYSE: Producing actionable reports and research to inform decision-makers.

FORECAST: Injecting foresight and prediction methodologies into the nuclear debate.

ENGAGE: Building trusted partnerships and strategic outreach to advance dialogue and reduce nuclear risks.





Overview

- I. Satellite Imagery as a Monitoring & Verification Tool
- II. Monitoring Nuclear Test Sites
- III. Integrating Satellite Imagery with IMS & OSI
- IV. Conclusion



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A satellite with large solar panels is shown in orbit above a stylized, color-coded map of the Earth. The map uses various colors (green, red, yellow, blue) to represent different land and water features, with blue lines indicating latitude and longitude.

I. SATELLITE IMAGERY AS A MONITORING & VERIFICATION TOOL



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
Satellite Imagery Utility

Uses of Satellite Imagery


- Provides non-intrusive and shareable visual data
- Enables geolocation and incident assessment
- Supports infrastructure and object monitoring, change detection and verification efforts
- Enhances transparency of on-the-ground situations, strengthening public awareness and confidence

Driving Factors

- Increased availability, accessibility and quality of imagery due to the growing commercial sector
- Rapidly developing technology



Mys Shmidtka Air Field 1960



Mys Shmidtka Air Field 2009

Key Analytical Techniques

High/medium-resolution optical imagery


- Area monitoring and geolocation
- Detailed image interpretation, change detection

Multispectral/Hyperspectral/Thermal infrared

- Extracting additional information about surface properties
- Identifying heat emissions due to human activity

Synthetic aperture radar

- Wide area monitoring
- Very precise change detection
- Assessment of surface deformations





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II. MONITORING NUCLEAR TEST SITES



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Key Monitoring Applications

Monitoring before a nuclear test

- Identifying and assessing test sites' infrastructure changes
- Surface deformation/excavation
- Detecting specific observables (such as drilling towers, cables, road networks, mining debris)

Monitoring after a nuclear test

- Surface deformation:
 - subsidence cratering and spallation, rockslides, avalanches
 - destruction of vegetation
- Unusual human activity (e.g. to pinpoint possible locations for OSI)



Limitations

- Ambiguity in interpreting activities (multiple possible explanations and limited historical data for temporal comparisons)
- Technological development may introduce new measurement equipment and testing procedures, changing expected indicators
- Difficulty in detecting less observable low-yield underground testing
- Limited confidence due to sensor constraints, lack of supporting data and uncertainty in distinguishing normal from abnormal activity





Open Nuclear Network's Assessments (2024)

Punggye-ri (DPRK)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maintenance• ~ 1 re-excavated tunnel that could be available for potential future tests
Lop Nur (PRC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maintenance and modernization, site expansion• ~ 5 tunnels for potential tests
Novaya Zemlya (RF)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maintenance and modernisation• ~ 6 tunnels for potential tests
NNSS (US)	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Maintenance, modernisation, expansion• Several tunnels and facilities for subcritical tests and other experiments, potential test readiness



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III. INTEGRATING SATELLITE IMAGERY WITH IMS & OSI



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Satellite Imagery for CTBT After Entry into Force

CTBT Art. IV, Par. 11:

“Each State Party undertakes to cooperate (...) in the improvement of the verification regime, and in the examination of the verification potential of additional monitoring technologies such as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring, with a view to developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost-effective verification of this Treaty (...)”



preparatory commission for the
comprehensive nuclear-test-ban
treaty organization

Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT)

and
Text on the Establishment of a
Preparatory Commission for the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organization




www.ctbto.org



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Example: Launch phase



Multi-temporal SAR composite of the Novaya Zemlya test site (RF) draped over Google Earth terrain model

73.374 N, 54.763 E

14 acquisitions Dec 2023-Mar 2024

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- Could help detect changes and surface deformations with precise location, complementing IMS data with clear visual evidence
- Could provide visual and, hence, intuitively understandable information for discussion during the consultation and clarification process
- Could serve as additional evidence for requesting on-site inspections



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Example: Pre-inspection phase



Overview of Lop Nur (PRC) with highlighted possible new test area (in red)

- Could help characterise different areas of the test site to give a general understanding of the place and delineate possible testing zones
- Familiarises the inspection team with site features (already envisioned since IFE 2014)
- Supports logistical planning, highlighting key areas for inspection (already envisioned since IFE 2014)

Example: Inspection phase



Punggye-ri (DPRK) with signs of personnel activities and restored entrance to a test tunnel

- Could help the team's orientation and navigation at the potential explosion site
- Could prepare the team for the overflight activity and the expected presence or absence of objects and equipment

Example: Post-inspection phase



P-Tunnel at NNSS (US) with movement of equipment after the chemical explosion on 18 October 2023

- Could add data for reporting with both analytical and visual value
- Could enhance understanding of what happened, where and how

37.229 N, 116.152 W

21 October 2023 (left), 19 November 2023 (right)

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
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Conclusions

- Growing number of commercial satellites and rapidly developing analytical approaches can provide reliable, non-intrusive, shareable, and actionable CTBT-relevant information
- Supports transparency and verification efforts
- Valuable for CTBTO inspections: site characterisation and post-test analysis
- Lessons can be learned from monitoring experiences by States, IOs and researchers
- Nuclear test sites are actively maintained and modernised





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