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
### **Motivation**

- Most source-term algorithms for atmospheric releases assume there is no influence from nuisance sources
- Industrial sources result in a world-wide background of xenon isotopes that are also useful for detecting nuclear explosions
- A source-location algorithm has been developed that explicitly accounts for nuisance sources
- This work evaluates algorithm performance using a data set with 384 synthetic release events containing <sup>133</sup>Xe
  - Can we identify a small release of <sup>133</sup>Xe in the presence of background sources?
  - Is there a threshold below which the release is masked by the nuisance sources?

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# **Release and Sampling Locations**



Sampler Characteristics: Brander, S., Baur, S., et al., 2022. J. Environ. Radioact. doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2022.107034

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
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### Release Setting

- 384 synthetic "explosion" release cases
- Two nuisance sources with continuous releases
  - Nuclear power plant (NPP): 10<sup>10</sup> Bq per day
  - Medical isotope production facility (MIPF): 10<sup>10</sup> Bq per day
- Atmospheric conditions
  - Use 4 ten-day periods spaced over 18 months (summer and winter)
- Sample concentrations developed using Hysplit based on high resolution WRF runs (900 m spatial resolution, 15 minute outputs) in time-forward mode
- Source-term estimation done using Hysplit and NOAA's High Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) meteorological data (3 km spatial resolution, 1 hour outputs) in time-reversed mode

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### Releases of <sup>133</sup>Xe from Fission Events





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# **Estimation Model Overview**

- Uses a Bayesian framework
- Can estimate releases from two nuisance facilities
  - Known locations
  - Unknown release rates (allowed to change every 3 h)
- Searches for a single release event with unknown release time, duration, location, and magnitude
- Use samples spanning about a week in time

Eslinger, P.W., J.M. Mendez, and B.T. Schrom. 2019. "Source Term Estimation in the Presence of Nuisance Signals." *J Environ Radioact* 203:220-225. doi:10.1016/j.jenvrad.2019.03.022




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### Comments on Samples (133Xe)

- Explosion emissions (no background)
  - 384 release cases (84 samplers)
  - 254 cases can be estimated (have detections)
    - 7 cases with all zero concentrations
    - 123 cases with all concentrations less than MDC
    - 40 cases with 1 detection
    - 214 cases with 2 or more detections
- Combined with background emissions
  - All 384 cases can be estimated
  - 123 of the cases have an "explosion" term that is greater than 0 but less than the MDC
  - Nuisance sources contribute from 5 to 28 mBq/m³ to maximum samples (depending on the week)



Maximum sample concentrations for a one-week time period (96 cases)

- Use samples for an entire week in the estimation
- All release cases are superimposed on the same background (for that time period)
- The nuisance sources dominate the sample concentrations for about 70% of the cases



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
# When do nuisance sources mask the release from a short-duration explosion?

### Results

Subset the release cases so the explosion causes increases at least one <sup>133</sup>Xe sample by:

- 0.5 mBq/m³: 226 cases
- 1.0 mBq/m<sup>3</sup>: 195 cases
- 5.0 mBq/m<sup>3</sup>: 114 cases
- 10 mBg/m<sup>3</sup>: 85 cases

The major source of estimation error is using one atmospheric model to generate sample concentrations (forward-time runs) and a different model in the source-term estimation (reversed-time runs).



At least one sample with an increment of 1 to 5 mBq/m<sup>3</sup> is needed to overcome most of the obfuscation from background sources.

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
Subset the release cases so the explosion causes increases at least one <sup>133</sup>Xe sample by:

• 0.5 mBq/m<sup>3</sup>: 209 cases

• 1.0 mBq/m<sup>3</sup>: 181 cases


• 5.0 mBq/m<sup>3</sup>: 111 cases

• 10 mBq/m<sup>3</sup>: 83 cases



# **Results Using Only 8 Samplers**

Lose 40 more cases with no explosion contribution relative to 84 samplers. Magnitude estimates are biased high. Timing error is mostly unchanged.



At least one sample with an increment 5 mBq/m³ helps overcome the obfuscation from background sources.



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### **In Summary**

### As expected:

- In some cases, it is possible to estimate release characteristics even in the presence of background emissions (especially for large releases)
- Release events resulting in small sample concentrations may be hidden by the background emissions

#### However:

 In some situations, the release can be detected even when the sample increments caused by the release event are much smaller than the largest sample concentrations caused by the nuisance sources



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### **Questions?**

### Questions?

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