

Disclaimer: The views expressed on this poster are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the view of the CTBTO




Introduction & Objectives

The computation of failure statistics and the failure analysis of IMS stations are on performed on a recurring basis since November 2011 in support of the following objectives:

- triggering the required maintenance and engineering activities,
- verifying that the implemented engineering and maintenance solutions led to improvements in reliability,
- initiating further technical analysis when needed (i.e., root cause analysis), and
- supporting the earliest identification of possible future failures.

For seismic, hydroacoustic and infrasound (SHI) stations, Data Availability Unauthenticated (DAU) status and variation over time are studied for each station to identify the main failures impacting DAU, especially for stations not reaching 98% DAU (requirement derived from the Operational Manuals).


The results of this study are presented on a yearly basis to CTBTO Member States during WGB sessions. This ePoster presents a brief overview of the approach taken and some examples of the results obtained.





SHI Station Model

The categorization of issues is made at the Failure Cause and Station Subsystem levels described • in the Station Model below:



 $\left|\right>$

on

TBTO

Definition of Failure Cause categories are detailed in the last slide.




Data sources & Method

Data Sources:

- DAU computed from cdtools
- IMS Reporting System (IRS) Problem Reports (PR) describing station issues and troubleshooting.

Method:


- Identification of stations DLs
- Identification of IRS PRs potentially related to DLs (~1000 PRs identified per year)
- PRs review and failures categorization according to the SHI Station Model
- Correspondence between DLs and Failure Causes / Station Subsystems
- Graphical representation and analysis





SnT2028 CTBT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE HOFBURG PALACE - Vienna and Online 19 TO 23 JUNE

Results: example for Primary Seismic stations (PS) - DAU

Percentage of PS stations meeting (green) and not meeting (red) 98% DAU







- % of stations with DAU > 98% are overall stable since 2013 (~73%)
- % of stations with different DAU levels are all overall stable since 2013.


INTRODUCTION **OBJECTIVES** METHODS/DATA RESULTS CONCLUSION $\left|\right>$ < P4.1-722 Leave empty QR code will be overlayed on touchscreen

CTBTO

-0-

SnT 2023 CTBT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE HOFBURG PALACE - Vienna and Online 19 TO 23 JUNE


Results: categorization of DL (example for PS stations)




SnT2023 CTBT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE HOFBURG PALACE - Vienna and Online 19 TO 23 JUNE

Results: example for Infrasound stations (IS) - DAU

Percentage of IS stations meeting (green) and not meeting (red) 98% DAU



Percentage of IS stations with different DAU levels



INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES

METHODS/DATA

RESULTS

CONCLUSION

P4.1-722

Leave empty

QR code will be overlayed

on touchscreen

 $\left|\right>$


 $\left|\right\rangle$

Continuous increase of % of stations with DAU above 98% DAU (> 90% in 2022)

- This can be explained by different factors, such as:
 - the certification of relatively new IS stations (e.g., IS60 in 2016, IS20 in 2017, IS03 in 2018, IS01 in 2019, IS25 in 2020) showing consistent high DAU performances over time, and
 - successful major station upgrades and recapitalizations (e.g., IS13, IS31, IS41, IS36, IS47) performed during the recent years.

SnT2023 CTBT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE HOFBURG PALACE - Vienna and Online 19 TO 23 JUNE


Results: categorization of DL (example for PS stations)




SnT2028 CTBT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CONFERENCE HOFBURG PALACE - Vienna and Online 19 TO 23 JUNE

Results: Severity Matrix (overview of recurrent DL contributors in the past years)

Failure Cause



- High number of failures categorized under **Equipment** have:
 - Low impact on PS and IS stations DAU
 - High impact on AS stations DAU (e.g. financial constraints)
- Few failures categorized as **Host Country** have a high impact on DAU.



- Few Sensor failures have a high impact on AS stations DAU
- High number of **Power** failures have a high impact on AS stations DAU



P4.1-722

Leave empty

QR code will be overlayed

on



Conclusion

The study is used to trigger and maintain relevant engineering projects to increase stations' robustness' to failures, as well as promoting mechanisms for prompt station recovery following downtime.

This study faces known challenges / limitations, such as:

- The usable data source: PRs are not meant to contain comprehensive information for root cause analysis
- The heterogeneity of stations: a wide variety of equipment combination, interfacing and configuration
- The interpretation in the case of multiple causes of failure
- The interpretation of the existence of root cause(s) vs. cause(s) preventing station recovery in expected delays

However, this study allows observing that main contributors to station downtime are:

- Failure Causes categorized under Host Country, and Equipment categories, and
- **Sensor** and **Power** issues, especially in the case of AS stations.

Going further, this study can be completed by <u>ad-hoc analysis</u> to further focus and investigate on the main issues identified at stations (e.g., power issues).







References: documents and definitions

Documents:

- CTBT/WGB/TL-11,17/15/REV.7 Operational Manual for Seismological Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data

- CTBT/WGB/TL-11,17/16-REV.7 Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic Monitoring and the International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data

- CTBT/WGB/TL-11,17/17-REV.7

Operational Manual for Infrasound Monitoring and the International Exchange of Infrasound Data

Definitions:

Failure Cause:	Definition:
Environment	Environmental conditions (e.g. flood, tsunami, fire, hurricane)
Equipment / Infrastructure	Station equipment or infrastructure
GCI	Global Communication Infrastructure, Independent Sub Network
Host Country	Political, financial, customs, human resources
Human Error	Mishandling or misconfiguration of equipment, absence of personnel at the station
IDC	International Data Center data processing pipeline, station testing
Planned Activity	Preventive maintenance and engineering planned activities
Third Party	Action of a third party (e.g. long absence of mains power supply, suppliers deficiencies, vandalism)
Other	Unspecified cause or any cause not specified in current categorization
Not Reported	Failure not reported in the IRS

INTRODUCTION

OBJECTIVES

METHODS/DATA

RESULTS

CONCLUSION

 $\langle \rangle$

P4.1-722

Please do not use this space, a QR code will be automatically overlayed